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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

NEW DISCIPLINARY REGULATIONS EXPLAINED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 15 Jul 81 p 3

[Understanding Regulations column by "Chien Si Dieu Lenh" (Regulations Warrior): "On Rewards and Punishment"]

[Text] (Answering a number of students at the Military Institute and comrade Nguyen Trung Nien, P.O. Box 10584, Ha Son Binh.)

Question: Have there been any changes in the forms of reward and punishment of our army's disciplinary regulations?

Answer: According to the newest stipulation of our army's disciplinary regulations, promulgated by the General Staff on 21 Bebruary 1981, the various forms of reward and punishment regarding our cadres and men were made uniform, as follows:

Regarding rewards:

As regards noncommissioned officers and enlisted men there are 10 forms of rewards, including:

1. Commendation for achievement.
2. Awarding of keepsakes.
3. Awarding of short leaves (1 to 10 days).
4. Awarding of letter of commendation.
5. Awarding of photograph taken under the unit flag.
6. Awarding of certificate of merit.
7. Promotion to next highest rank ahead of schedule.
8. Awarding of designation of honor and insignia (Hero, Emulation Warrior, Determined-to-Win Warrior).
9. Awarding of a medal or order.
10. Awarding of designation of Hero of the People's Armed Forces.

As regards officers, there are eight forms of rewards which are the same as those for noncommissioned officers and enlisted men (minus the forms of the awarding of short leaves and the awarding of photographs taken under the unit flag).

With regard to punishment:

As regards noncommissioned officers and enlisted men, there are eight forms of punishment:

1. Censure.
2. Restriction to camp (or refusal of permission to go ashore, in the case of naval personnel) on days off.
3. Warning.
4. Disciplinary detention of from 1 to 10 days (not applied to female military personnel).
5. Assignment of lesser position.
6. Demotion.
7. Discharge.
8. Dismissal from military service.

As regards officers, there are seven forms of punishment:

1. Censure.
2. Warning.
3. Assignment of lesser position.
4. Dismissal from position.
5. Reduction in rank.
6. Deprivation of officers' insignia
7. Dismissal from military service.

(Officers are not subjected to disciplinary detention, as are noncommissioned officers and enlisted men).

Question: Which echelon has the authority to award leaves, and which echelon has the authority to impose disciplinary detention on noncommissioned officers and enlisted men?

With regard to awards:

Answer: Battalion commanders and officers of equivalent rank are authorized to award leaves not exceeding 5 days to squad leaders.

Regimental commanders and officers of equivalent rank are authorized to award leaves not exceeding 10 days to squad leaders.

With regard to punishment:

Regimental commanders and officers of equivalent rank are authorized to impose disciplinary detention on squad leaders not exceeding 10 days.

Thus the form of punishment of disciplinary detention can only be imposed at the regimental level or higher. The battalion or lower echelons are not authorized to impose disciplinary detention on noncommissioned officers and enlisted men, but are only authorized to make a recommendation to the upper echelon if they believe there is a need to impose that form of punishment.

Question: Are cadres authorized to apply forms of punishment other tjam tjpse above?

Answer: There are no other forms of punishment in the army than those above. No cadre is authorized to stipulate other forms of punishment to punish military personnel under his command. If military personnel commit violations, they will be dealt with in accordance with state laws that have been promulgated, depending on the seriousness of the violation.

5616
CSO: 4209/ 444

BRIEFS

PRC SPIES--The militia of the border villages of Phong Tho District, implementing the slogan "A Plow in One Hand, a Rifle in the Other" and working and producing well, have intensified their military training and conducted patrols to protect their villages. As a result, during the first 5 months of 1981 alone, the militia of X.L., V.M.C., M.L., C. and other villages apprehended six groups of Chinese intelligence agents and spies who crossed the border in a vain attempt to make contact with reactionary elements in order to conduct acts of sabotage. [Excerpt] [Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Jul 81 p 2] 7809

CSO: 4209/429

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

MEASURES TO STABILIZE PRICES REPORTED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 8 Jul 81 p 2

[Dispatch by Trinh Tuong: "What Does One See at Ho Chi Minh City Market?"]

[Text] How can one go to all 120 markets, big and small, in this city--not to speak of hundreds of "squatting" ones scattered all over, along street and squares where 4, 5, 7...streets intersect? The crowded network of markets crisscrosses the entire city with more than 150,000 registered professional merchants. In addition, there are tens of thousands of unregistered merchants--those who do business on a part-time, temporary and seasonal basis. The great number of markets and merchants make it difficult to do market management work. Prices in the markets irregularly go up and down, they even fluctuate hourly if the forces of state commerce and cooperatives are not strong enough to "occupy the battlefield" and restrain the market. A single rumor about goods inventory by the state suffices to cause commodities to almost disappear from stalls in the next couple of hours, shooting prices up.

Or the rumor that "today a very few rice trucks have arrived in the bus station serving the western areas" may increase rice price by 3 to 5 hao per kg. But only a couple of hours following confirmation that these kinds of rumors are false, stalls are again packed with goods and prices are back to normal.

Notwithstanding this, price fluctuations at hundreds of markets in the city depend on a handful of centers. From these, prices go out in all directions, governing the whole free market in the city. The reason is that all small merchants have to go there to buy. Each market center deals mainly in a few commodities. I visited a number of markets, Ben Thanh, Binh Tay, An Dong, Cau Muoi-Cau Ong Lanh, Tan Dinh, Tran Chanh Chieu, An Lac, Xom Cui, etc. Among them there are some market centers: An Lac for pork; Binh Tay for handicraft products; Tran Chanh Chieu for rice: Xom Cui for sea fish; Cho Cau Muoi-Cau Ong Lanh for vegetables, fruit and fish...Market center customers include temporary merchants from the provinces, retailers from municipal markets, owners of sundry goods stores and small merchants from open air markets. Therefore, it is very easy to understand why when prices at master markets fluctuate, those at other places immediately follow suit.

Only by following prices and looking at current business methods at various markets can one see the remarkable effort of state commerce and cooperative commerce at wrestling and struggling over nearly the past month to keep market prices from shooting up. Prices on almost all commodities have been posted. Rice sells at 6-7

dong per kg, lean pork from 45 to 50 dong per kg, sugar 20 dong per kg, black beans 13 dong per kg, soap bars and soap cakes from 12 to 14 dong per kg...

Although at this or that place figures on price lists are still blurred, although price lists are kept away from customers' view, or although posted prices differ from selling ones, price posting is a success--an Uncle Tu Anh, a retired cadre told us at Tran Chanh Chieu market--since it has created a legal basis for business, making buyers more at ease.

As a matter of fact, it is no easy task to ensure that tens of thousands of merchants display price lists on thousands of commodities. From leading comrades of the city on down to those in precincts, districts and wards, all have had to exert firm guidance day by day with the use of three kinds of measures--educational, administrative and economic. As for economic measures alone, each day the state commercial sector must bring into the city 45 tons of vegetables from Da Lat, 23 tons of vegetables from the suburbs, and 52 tons of pork. Each day Food Corporation 3 brings 60 tons of fish into the city. To sell meat alone to cadres, workers, civil servants and the armed forces according to standards, Food Corporation 1 must provide up to 20 tons of pork. The Vi San plant must slaughter 800-900 pigs daily to supply the city. The State Grain Corporation has launched into the market thousands of tons of rice at prices guaranteeing continuation of business...In addition to the forces of state commerce, the cooperative commercial sector has also taken part in this struggle in a fairly enthusiastic manner. Aside from hundreds of additional stores and vending centers opened by state commerce in June, the cooperative commercial sector has opened 60 more food vending centers in the markets, selling daily from 30 to 40 tons of vegetables and fruit, tens of tons of pork and tens of thousands of liters of sauce. In particular, the consumer cooperative of precinct 1 which manages the fishyard at Cau Ong Lanh market, distributes daily 40 tons of fish, snails and oysters to its own wards.

As of now, the price situation in the city free market has shown signs of gradual stability and no longer has sudden fluctuations as during the first days of June. The day we arrived at Go Vap market, the price situation there apparently looked better. The Go Vap district people's committee has set unified prices throughout the district for 150 commodities, using the May 1981 price levels as standards. At the market, we saw that lean pork sold at 45 dong per kg (meat from private merchants sold at 47 dong), and that ham sold at 43 dong. As for top quality white upland rice, the price was 6.9 dong per kg, versus 7.5 dong for glutinous rice.

Nevertheless, the comrades in the commercial sector have assessed the situation more cautiously. The initial results of recent days were not yet really steady and secure. A loose link--any link--in the system would permit bad elements to squeeze in immediately and the market situation could fluctuate anew.

In fact, the ongoing struggle of the city in the fields of goods distribution and circulation is no less fierce. Educating and struggling with small merchants, store owners and stall owners is already protracted and difficult; however, struggling with those standing behind them is much more difficult and complicated. Business dealings at a number of market centers here are characteristically very different from those in other provinces and cities. Goods displayed on stalls do not necessarily all belong to stall owners. They invest only a small amount of capital in business, while nearly all goods displayed on their stalls are consigned by

"supply agents," who dictate the prices. Stall owners sell goods on commission, ranging from 10 to 20 percent of the selling price. Each of these stalls has at least 10 "supply agents." Only after a consignment has been sold do the supply agents show up to collect their money and replenish the stock. Thus, both sides are closely tied up together by interest, and it is up to supply agents to determine whether prices are high or low.

As a result of education and struggle, a number of commodities essential to existence tend to be stablizing; however, many other commodities still sell at high prices, particularly articles in aluminum, plastic and imitation leather...Another to market observers, current prices on handicraft goods are up from January 1981 by 10 to 40 percent.

The struggle to stabilize the city market is being pursued strongly and regularly to prevent sudden price fluctuations which would cause more difficulties to cadres, workers, civil servants and the laboring people. However, the situation in the unorganized market will certainly go through complicated developments.

9213
CSO: 4209/425

PRICES OF COMMODITIES FOR CADRES, WORKERS DISSOCIATED FROM MARKET PRICE SYSTEM

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 27 Jun 81 p 1

[Article by C.P.: "Two Supply and Business Systems Dissociated in Entire City Trade Sector - Sixth Precinct First to Implement This Policy"]

[Text] In order to insure the supply of various commodities according to the criteria stipulated for cadres, employees and consumers in the exact amount and quality and in time, while at the same time expanding the service business, the city Trade Service has instructed the whole sector that from the end of June on they should dissociate the network of subsidized price commodities from the network of business price commodities at the municipal, precinct and district levels and make them into two separate networks.

The subsidized price commodity stores are charged with supplying essential commodities to those entitled to them in accordance with the criteria and to stable prices encompassing meat, fish, monosodium glutamate, sugar, soap, nuoc mam, fuel and materials.

The stores selling at business prices have the mission of dealing with commodities that lie outside the criteria-determined commodities in accordance with guaranteed business prices in order to struggle and bring down gradually the market prices to a reasonable level.

The subsidized price network is expanded more or less depending on the number of cadres and employees that we serve, on the basis of convenience to the customers. In the immediate future, because the supply of criteria-determined commodities to the cadres and employees of various central and city organs and enterprises has not reached in time the precincts and districts at the local level the supply of subsidized price commodities must still be temporarily be done by the general stores that are directly under the supervision of the Trade Service. Eventually these subsidized price commodities shall be given to the precincts and districts for them to be directly responsible for their distribution.

After the districts and precincts are fully in charge of the retail link (both in subsidized price and regular business commodities), the level 2 corporations of the city will move into business tasks, actually implement production, process and organize centralized procurement of commodities in accordance to plans B and C, buying from sister provinces while at the same time organizing the supply and distribution to the precincts and districts.

The precinct and district-level trade units are responsible for procuring locally

produced and locally consumed commodities in the cooperatives and from the individual producers in the locality so as to insure a balanced supply and demand situation in the locality in accordance with the plans entrusted from above; they also are procurement agents for the city's specialized corporations and carry out these activities in accordance with their economic contracts.

In order to manage the subsidized price commodities in exact conformity with the state's stipulations, the various units must proceed immediately to the job of dissociating the two commodity funds: the commodities sold at subsidized prices and those sold at business prices starting 1 July 1981.

By now, the Building Materials, Trade and Living Conditions section of the Sixth Precinct has completed the preparations for building the network of stores, cadres and employees needed to dissociate the two subsidized price commodity and business price commodity systems.

The Sixth Precinct will open its network of subsidized price commodities sold according to criteria in the area of Hau Giang Street: the store located at 180 Hau Giang Street will sell at subsidized prices such commodities as sugar, monosodium glutamate, materials, soap and milk for babies; the sotre located at number 182 (Hau Giang Street) will sell at subsidized prices prok, fish and nuoc mam. Burning oil, however, is sold at a nearby store.

This subsidized price commodity area is responsible for selling the various criteria-determined commodities for 5,000 cadres and employees belonging to the Sixth Precinct and thousands of cadres and employees belonging to 72 central and city organs who are stationed within the district.

The network of business price stores which participate in the market is organized at 7 different localities within the precinct: number 15-17 Ba Hom Street, number 610 and number 92F Hau Giang Street, number 85-89 Pham Phu Thu Street, number 18 Le Quang Hien Street, number 74 and number 32E Thap Muoi Street.

Each store has at least three counters. The store at number 74 Thap Muoi Street, however, has 8 counters and the one at number 32E Thap Muoi has 20 counters. In Binh Tay market the precinct Food Store still maintains two stalls to sell pork as in the past.

1751
CSO: 4209/432

BRIEFS

GENERAL IMPORT/EXPORT CORPORATION--To serve in timely fashion the import and export of building materials and commodities in accordance with the needs of various localities and sectors, the Ministry of Foreign Trade has just established the General Import/Export Corporation (abbreviated to Generalimex), located in Ho Chi Minh City. The establishment of this corporation creates favorable conditions for the localities, especially the provinces of the Mekong delta and Ho Chi Minh City, to expand their export of commodities lying outside the planned targets as assigned by the state. [Text] [Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 25 Jun 81 p 4] 1751

CSO: 4209/432

COOPERATIVE HAS GOOD HARVEST DESPITE POOR CONTRACTING-OUT

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 15 Jul 81 p 2

[Article by Nguyen Van Don: "Why Did Hung Chinh Cooperative Have a Successful Harvest Despite Poor Organization of Contracting-Out?"]

[Text] We arrived at Hung Chinh cooperative (Hung Nguyen District, Nghe Tinh Province) after the people had harvested the fifth-month rice and were planting the tenth-month rice. In contrast to last year, this year Hung Chinh had a good fifth-month rice crop and harvested it rapidly and efficiently. Output amounted to 301.9 tons of rice, about 45 tons more than last year's fifth-month crop. During the present season the cooperative's grain obligation to the state was 160 tons, about 25 tons more than last year. The average yield per sao was 100 kilos of paddy, while it was only 70 kilos last year. The value of a work day also increased notably this year. In the hamlets the people are enthusiastic because all families harvested more paddy than last year. Some families' harvests were double or triple those of last year.

We asked the cooperative director, "Why did Hung Chinh have a successful crop?" "Because of favorable weather conditions, but mainly because the cooperative did a good job of organizing the contracting out of rice output to laborers." After hearing his answer, we sought to understand how Hung Chinh had organized the contracting of output.

Hung Chinh applied the method of contracting output to laborers, but its organization of contracting was not good, and the cooperative failed to assure a number of stipulated tasks.

After working several days with cooperative cadres and interviewing cooperative members, we saw that although Hung Chinh applied the contracting-out form, the cooperative assumed responsibility for five tasks: soil preparation, seedstock, fertilizer, irrigation, and the prevention and elimination of insects and diseases. It contracted out to cooperative members three tasks: transplanting, tending, and harvesting. But in fact, although the cooperative made all-out efforts it failed to assure the good performance of such tasks as soil preparation, seedstock, and fertilizer. After failing to carry out its intention to prepare the soil for the entire cooperative, Hung Chinh contracted out 360 mau and 219 water buffaloes and oxen to the units, so that they could organize soil preparation for the cooperative

member families. Therefore, each unit had to set up a labor team specializing in soil preparation headed by the deputy team leader. The cooperative stipulated that before land was contracted-out to the cooperative, the team had to complete the plowing of the entire area and meet requirements regarding techniques and time. That stipulation could not be carried out because some members of the plowing team were not truly positive, worked when they felt like it, and conserved the water buffaloes' strength when plowing and harrowing and were afraid of damaging their plows and harrows, so they plowed carlessly and plowed shallow. We asked a production unit leader, "What was the reason for that situation?" He replied, "There are many reasons. One was that the production organization, management, and coordination work of the cooperative and the units was not tight, control was not deep and close, and supervision was not timely. Second, the cooperative set the rate of only eight work-points for plowing and harrowing a sao of land, and 86 animal husbandry work-points for raising a water buffalo, with penalties for sickly water buffaloes which are weak and sub-standard. However, last year the value of a work day was low -- only .5 kilo of paddy -- so people who raised water buffaloes and plowed were not enthusiastic, which resulted in failure to plow the required number of days or the required area, or in the entire area being plowed but plowed rapidly and carelessly, without assuring technical standards.

The chief accountant told us that another reason was that the cooperative was not yet able to supply plows and harrows to the cooperative members. The value of plows and harrows was included in the 86 water-buffalo raising work-points the cooperative contracted to cooperative members raising water buffaloes. In the past, when a plow or harrow was damaged the collective would repair it, but now if one was damaged the person who raised the water buffalo and was also the ploughman had to repair it or buy one for nearly 100 dong. When a plow or harrow was broken, it was of course necessary to stop work. Some families which wanted to raise water buf faloes had to buy plows and harrows first. Some cooperative members were "far-sighted" and sought ways to conserve the water buffaloes' strength and save wear-and-tear on the plows, for they feared that later on the cooperative would contract out land to the families on a "blank check" basis and they would have no implements to work the land. Furthermore, some people in the plowing teams were not impartial, and when they knew in advance which fields would be assigned to their families they would plow those fields more carefully. That situation resulted in plowing and harrowing not being done as rapidly and effeciently as expected.

Comrade Khoat, head of unit 5A, said that in soil preparation his unit attained only 80 percent of the requirements regarding time and technical quality. Therefore, some people had to plow or hoe additionally.

With regard to seedstock, the cooperative had no closely supervised plan to divide up the rice seedlings, so when the seedlings were green and healthy and ready to be transplanted, the families which had many members or arrived first quickly uprooted the good seedlings, while families which had few members or arrived later were left with the bad seedlings. Therefore, there arose many conflicts among cooperative members and between cooperative members and the production units.

As for fertilizer, the cooperative did not firmly control its sources and did not correctly calculate the amount of fertilizer needed to supply to cooperative

members. Therefore, in the course of production many families lacked fertilizer so the units had to transfer fertilizer from one family to another so that transplanting could be carried out in time. Due to that situation, some families even spread on fields manure that they hadn't had time to compost. There were also families which did not participate in the cooperative's plan to equalize fertilizer, but concealed fertilizer to use on their own contracted-out fields, so there were families which lacked fertilizer and were forced to transplant without it.

The cooperative carried out well only the irrigation task and the prevention and elimination of insects and diseases.

In brief, there were still deficiencies in the cooperative's organization and support of tasks related to contracting-out, so the cooperative members who accepted contracted work encountered considerable difficulties in the course of production. So how was Hung Chinh cooperativive still able to have a good harvest?

The contracting of output met the aspirations of the cooperative members, so everyore fully utilized all labor capabilities and all material resources in order to overcome difficulties and win victory in the fifth-month season.

Many cooperative members in Hung Chinh cooperative told us that "Although the cooperative was still confused in organizing contracting-out, that method of contracting-out was still better than when there was no contracting-out, for only with contracting-out can we fully utilize all labor capabilities and all material resources in production." After speaking with many people, we realized that that observation was very correct.

During the same time last year, before the contracting of output was instituted, Duoc market was crowed with people from Hung Chinh Village. Every day, as many as 40 percent of the main laborers were shopping, making bricks and tiles, baking lime, or hauling goods for others to earn maney with which to buy rice. In the entire cooperative, only 30 to 40 percent of the laborers worked the required 150 days (for women) or 170 days (for men) during a season. The harvest was poor, and the value of a work day was only .5 kilo of paddy. But during this year's season, due to the contracting out of output the cooperative members paid much attention to the fields. Nearly all of the main laborers focused their energies on production. The old people, the children, and the people working in the organs made full use of their spare time by participating in production. In Hung Chinh, the most distant field was onlu two kilometers away, but during the season all families took their meals to the fields and ate then there in order to have additional work time. Many headless households, such as that of Mrs. Binh, a cooperative member in unit 1A whose husband was working far from home and whose family included three children and a 71-year-old mother-in-law, and that of Mrs. Lanh, Mrs. Vuong, etc., all of whom requested contracted-out land. With the help of their relatives and neighbors, and by means of their own efforts, those families surpassed the contracted-out norms in harvesting.

Since the cooperative was not yet able to assure a number of tasks in the production process, the cooperative members took the initiative in overcoming difficulties in order to produce on schedule and effectively. If the rice seedlings were not in good shape, the cooperative members spread more fertilizer and took better care of

them. When there was a shortage of fertilizer, many families raised additional livestock and poultry and produced green fertilizer and alluvium. Twenty-three families in the village purchased water buffaloes in order to both increase draft power and have additional fertilizer.

It may be said that because the cooperative members exerted themselves in production, although the cooperative did not fully assure the production conditions Hung Chinh still had a successful harvest. But it must also be realized that if a cooperative does not do a good job of organizing contracting, there can be no solid basis on which to assure victories.

Hung Chinh cooperative must study and resolve the legitimate worries of the cooperative members.

Since the victorious fifth month-spring season, in addition to their enthusiasm the members of Hung Chinh cooperative members have had many worries and perplexities because the cooperative still has not done a good job of such tasks as soil preparation, producing seedstock, etc., during the present tenth-month season.

We have learned that after realizing that during the recent fifth-month season the plowing teams did not meet the requirements, the cooperative met with the production units and changed the working method as follows: each production unit was divided into many groups. The cooperative divided the water buffaloes among the units, so that they could divide them among the groups. The groups stipulated that each Class-A water buffalo would plow two mau. Two or three families with contracted-out land amounting to two mau would be combined to form a small team which shared a water buffalo to do the plowing. The people who did the plowing would receive workpoints determined by the cooperative. The people feared that with that method of organizing soil preparation it would be difficult to avoid the situation of the people who kept the water buffalo plowing their own land more carefully and more on schedule than when they plow other people's land. The people who did not keep a water buffalo would be more or less dependant on the plowers. Therefore, some people had to find ways to "gain the favor" of those who did the plowing by cutting additional grass for the water buffalo to eat (although they were not required to do so) or "giving extra" so the plower would plow their land more carefully. Furthermore, when the water buffalo was sick there would be no draft power for plowing.

As for seedstock, during the presen season the cooperative distributed seedstock to the units, which distributed them to the groups. Some groups organized joint seedling sowing, but others distributed to the cooperative members so that each person could sow their own seeds, so the people encountered considerable difficulties. When we went to the home of Mrs. Lan we saw a small seedling bed of about 10 square meters on the bank of a pond. The seedlings were very thick and crowded one another. She saod, "The seedling bed assigned by the unit had no water, so I had to sow them in my private plot. I'm very worried about what I'll do this season if I don't have enough seedlings to transplant." Many other headless households were also very concerned over the cooperative's method of handling the seedstock task. Mrs. Bang was distributed six kilos of seed rice before she had time to prepare a seedling bed, so she had to take them home. She was worried that she would not be able to grow the seedlings on schedule.

In addition to those specific worries, some cooperative members with a broader outlook asked the questions, "Is Hung Chinh cooperative's method of organizing contracting-out tending increasingly to become 'blank check' contracting-out? With that method of organizing contracting-out, will the material-technical bases and the specialized units gradually fade away? When difficulties are encountered with regard to weather, how can laborers who accept contracting-out overcome them?"

A cadre from Hung Chinh who was on detached assignment told us, "I'm only concerned that the comrades in the cooperative will only see that the fifth-month crop was succesful and will not realize that their organization of contracting-out is not good, and will not study and correctly implement the policy of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee."

We think that that is a legitimate worry and concern of the cooperative members which the Hung Chinh cooperative must study and resolve, in order to assure that better results are attained in the tenth month season than during the recent fifth month season.

5616
CSO: 4209/444

CONSTRUCTION RATE OF PHA LAI POWER PLANT ACCELERATED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 19 Jul 81 p 1

[VNA News Release: "Pha Lai Thermoelectric Power Plant Construction Site Excavates 843,850 Cubic Meters of Earth and Rock, Accelerates Construction Rate of Principal Project Items"]

[Text] During the second quarter of this year, the units participating in the construction of the Pha Lai thermoelectric power plant accelerated the construction rate of the principal project items. During June the construction site concentrated its construction forces, combined mechanized labor with manual labor, dredged 4,000 cubic meters of mud, pumped 16,000 cubic meters of water from the foundation excavations, and overcame the consequences of the flooding of the water circulation pumping station. Therefore, the construction site was able to rapidly pour more than 2,200 cubic meters of concrete to form the pumping station building and the working area floors and raise their level from four feet below the surface to 3.2 meters above the surface.

The all-out efforts made during the second quarter helped the site to maintain the construction rate of such important project items as the bunker compartment, the steam boiler room of the main plant, etc. The construction site as a whole has excavated 843,850, cubic meters of earth and rock, poured 20,314 cubic meters of concrete, constructed 8,835 square meters of various kinds of walls, machined and installed 3,164 tons of iron and steel, installed 3,740 meters of various kinds of pipe, and constructed 16,500 square meters of barracks for the workers. Construction Corporation No 18 transported large quantities of cement, bricks, and rock, received industrial equipment, and did a good job of serving construction. The "69-1" machinery installation enterprise assembled nine cranes of the various kinds, and for the first time assembled a EK-1000 crane in our country.

However, the site's construction rate is still slower than called for by the plan. In order to accelerate the construction rate, the site launched an emulation campaign to achieve accomplishments to celebrate the Fifth Party Congress which had specific objectives: the completion of construction of the steam boiler room by 30 September 1981; the completion of construction of the turbine rooms and the bunker compartments of units No 1 to No 15 by the end of this year; and the completion of construction of the water circulation pumping station, the central control building, the 110 KV electricity distribution station, and many other project items.

5616
CSO: 4209/444

NEW SHIPPING PROCEDURES NEEDED TO STOP LOSSES OF GRAIN

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 Jul 81 p 2

[Article by Vu Thanh Tu and Hoang Luu: "Closing the Loopholes in the Transportation, Shipping and Receiving of Grain"]

[Text] During the past 2 years, the volume of grain transported has constituted a rather high percentage of the cargo transported, especially along the North-South route; meanwhile, wharehouse space, bags, scales, boats and vehicles are in short supply. Rice and paddy are put in bags of different sizes and types, in new bags as well as old bags and sometimes spill from these bags. On one trip, cargo is transpoted by many different means of ocean and river transportation, by vehicle, by train and by rudimentary means of transportation belonging to the state-operated, joint public-private, cooperative and private segments of the economy in order to reach the hands of consumers. One problem that has arisen is that in shipping and receiving operations, the weighing of cargo is inaccurate and allows tens of thousands of tons to be lost each year without anyone being responsible. This is a major loophole, one used by decadent elements to steal more than a small amount of grain when it is being transported on ships and trucks and when it is being loaded or unloaded.

The organization and management of shipping and receiving operations are still lax. In the transportation process, from the time that the level I and II grain agencies receive and ship grain on state-operated and joint public-private means of transportation, very large amounts of grain are lost. Even in this stage, bags of rice transferred from four to six different types of means of transportation and, although each transfer involves shipping and receiving procedures, the rice is only weighed twice. It is weighed for the first time at the mill in western Nam Bo and weighed for the last time when it reaches the level II granaries in the northern provinces. In the intermediary stages, the grain passes through many different granaries, railroad stations and ports on three or four different types of boats and vehicles over a distance of thousands of kilometers with shipping and receiving procedures primarily only involving counting the bags that are showing (at some times and places, a number of bags are weighed to verify the contents). And, it is here that the largest waste of grain occurs.

On a number of motorized barges and boats that transport rice from the western region to the port of Saigon, boat and barge owners "shift bags"(that is, they pour the rice into old bags and take the new bags for themselves) and take some of the rice in the process. This practice generally goes very smoothly because at boatside or when delivering the rice to the port, only the bags that are showing are counted. For this reason, there is generally a very large difference in the amount of grain recorded on the manifests of many large ships going to northern seaports and the actual amount of rice loaded on them. In April 1981, the ship Haiphong transported 5,500 tons of rice and paddy to Dong Hoi but was short more than 850 tons. In the Bach Dang area of the port of Haiphong, the ships Dong Nai and Song Gianh, which were transporting broken grains of rice, unloaded onto river ships 20 to 30 tons less than actually recorded when these two ships were loaded. On 17 May 1981, vessel SM51 of the Bach Dang River Transport Enterprise was loaded with 1,256 bags of rice (105,564 kilograms); however, when the rice was delivered to the Co Cong Wharf, 31,962 kilograms were missing. Many ships deliver from 50 to 60 tons less than stated on their manifests. In 5 months of transporting broken grains of rice on 56 barge trips, the total quantity recorded on manifests was 7,169 tons but 1,303 tons less were delivered(!). Generally speaking, roughly 10 percent of the grain transported is lost but, in some cases, this figure is as high as 20 or 30 percent. In which stages of transportation is rice lost, where is it lost? Is it lost because it is dropped and scattered on the ground or stolen? Who is responsible for this loss? In view of the present mode of shipping and receiving grain, it is difficult to answer these questions precisely. Some corrupt cadres, manual workers and ship personnel have taken advantage of these loopholes to steal state property. They employ many different methods to engage in collective conspiracy and theft in the transportation process, in the cargo handling process and so forth, giving as an excuse "the permissible loss rate" or "cargo is delivered in the exact same way it is received." The driver of a truck transporting rice from Haiphong to Hanoi can "stab" various bags of rice and take out 2 or 3 dozen kilograms, which is a commonplace practice because rice is received on the basis of counting the number of bags showing but delivered on the basis of weight, consequently, who is to say that the rate of loss conforms or does not conform with regulations. This is not to mention the more than a few cases in which drivers and seamen conspire with stevedores and grain personnel to steal from a few to a dozen bags of rice during shipping and receiving operations. On 11 January, tugboat K.107, after selling more than 5 tons of rice to a dishonest merchant, was detained; the grain remaining on the boat's barge was weighed and turned out to be 7 tons more than recorded on the shipping manifest(?).

The principle "one bag received, one bag delivered," which has been in effect for nearly 2 decades, was suited to grain transportation under war time circumstances. It does not have the quantitative basis needed to establish a permissible rate of loss. In recent years, the shipping and receiving of grain have, at some times and places, been carried out on the basis of accurately weighing grain. However, material-technical bases are not matched, there is a shortage of equipment and lack of close coordination and grain is handled slowly, consequently, there is always an urgent need for grain to be transported. As a result, the new shipping and receiving regulations were rapidly ignored and we returned to receiving a certain number of bags and delivering a certain number of bags.

A number of other shipping and receiving principles that are now in effect must also be improved. The most widely used implement for loading and unloading bulk cargoes of grain, such as wheat kernels, corn kernels and so forth is a clam-shell bucket. Each clam-shell bucket is considered to be one unit and the number of times the bucket is loaded is multiplied by the capacity of the bucket to determine the quantity of cargo recorded on the manifest. The lack of accuracy in the use of a clam-shell bucket for this purpose is easily recognized but nothing has been done to correct this. Even the commonly used practice of sending an escort to accompany the shipment of grain to the port still results in a loss rate of 7-8 percent even over short distances.

As regards cargo shipped in bags, in addition to the principle of delivering the same number of bags that are received, the transport and grain sectors frequently ship and receive this type of cargo in closed compartments and sealed railroad cars. The river transport sector has more than 100 closed compartment barges used to transport grain and other types of cargo contained in bags. The owners of cargo prefer this method of shipment above all others. Yet, there are still boat personnel who conspire with shipping and receiving personnel to buy "lead clasps"; in deserted areas along the transportation route, they break the original seal, steal cargo and then put on a new seal. Similar incidents also occur with railroad cars sealed with lead clasps.

For a long time, we have given little attention to inspecting, evaluating and summarizing the shipping and receiving measures in effect and have not rapidly established an improved mode of shipping and receiving of a legal nature. Losses of cargo occur in a widespread and routine fashion but neither party--not the owners of cargo or the owners of the means of transportation--bear any material responsibility to the state. Everyone has long known that there is a lack of accuracy in the weighing, measuring and counting of cargo but coordinated steps to thoroughly resolve this problem have not been taken by the weights and measures sector, the registration sector or the functional agencies. Hardly any of the major cargo handling terminals, such as the port of Saigon, the port of Haiphong and the inland river ports such as Hanoi, Nam Dinh, Bac Giang, Viet Tri and so forth have large scales capable of weighing entire trucks and railroad cars. At present, very many scales are broken and there is a shortage of both spare parts and the tools needed to perform repair work. The grain sector has placed an order to buy 10 truck scales but the scale factory has only delivered 3. It generally takes 2 years to install and put one of these scales into operation. As long as the mode of shipping and receiving is based on delivering the same number of bags shipped, the use of bags that comply with specifications and standards is necessary and will limit our losses. Recently, 4 million new bags were supplied to the grain sector in the southern provinces but a number of localities did not use them and substituted old bags in their place. Deserving of reprimand is that even within some grain shipping and receiving agencies, bags are being "distributed at internal prices" of 1, 2 or 2.5 dong per new bag. Some persons are buying these bags and selling them at 25 to 30 dong per bag. After each phase of such unprincipled distribution, the deputy director of a grain shipping and receiving corporation and his wife have earned an additional 1,000 or 2,000 dong.

At present, the Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Communications and Transportation and the Ministry of Interior are focusing their efforts on implementing positive measures designed to protect grain in the transportation process. The uniform regulations now in effect are: 100 kilogram, new bags will be used to ship grain along the North-South route; the boatside unloading of grain may not be practiced in the port of Saigon; when shipping and receiving cargo, it is necessary to verify the contents of at least 10 to 15 percent of the total number of bags; grain being transported to the armed forces must be turned over to the owner of the cargo and escorted from the railroad station and so forth. If there is strict compliance with these regulations, losses will significantly decline. In trans-shipment operations from seaports to the hinterland, in order to rapidly unload ships and handle cargo and insure the quantity and quality of cargo, primarily bulk shipments of grain, the Ministry of Grain and the Ministry of Communications and Transportation are conducted a pilot project in shipping and receiving cargo on the basis of the waterline of vessels. Initial shipments have yielded good results: the percentage of loss has been low and the figures obtained by measuring the waterline of ships have not been significantly different from the actual amount of grain on each barge, which was determined by weighing the cargo.

A mode of shipping and receiving that is scientifically based must be quickly established in order to reduce losses in the process of transporting grain and many other products. In the immediate future, it is necessary to correctly implement the responsibility regulations that have been promulgated by the state. Together with investing in additional material bases and researching and applying weights and measures techniques and an advanced mode of shipping and receiving, tight organization and management in conjunction with the use of material incentives for persons engaged in shipping, receiving and handling cargo will yield practical results.

7809
CSO: 4209/429

BIN DINH HA TRIED FOR POSSESSION, PRODUCTION OF REACTIONARY MATERIALS

Trial Inaugurated

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 25 Jun 81 pp 1, 4

[Article by P.V.: "Trial of Bui Dinh Ha for Circulating and Creating Reactionary and Corrupt Cultural Materials"]

[Text] On the morning of 25 June 1981 the People's Court of Ho Chi Minh City inaugurated the trial of Bui Dinh Ha who was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of storing, circulating and producing reactionary and corrupt cultural materials, following the decision of the Public Security Service to prosecute him and the decision of the People's Organ of Control of Ho Chi Minh City to ratify the charges.

Presiding at the trial was Mr. Nguyen Thanh Vinh, Chief Justice of the People's Court of Ho Chi Minh City. Mr. Le Trong, Deputy Director of the Road Freight Transportation Company, and Mrs. Thai Thi Ngoc Du, instructional cadre at the city's University, served as the people's jury, and Miss Pham Thi Dieu Hoa served as the recording secretary of the court session.

Bui Dinh Ha was born on 5 April 1952 in Hanoi, is domiciled at 497 lot F Nguyen Dinh Chieu Street, Third Precinct; he is a merchant by profession and has had 5 years of schooling in the 12-year track.

After having gone south in 1954, Ha helped in his father's business of selling books and magazines and of "running" films among the various cinema theaters. In 1971 he went into the army and was sent to the 3rd artillery battalion of the paratroopers.

After 30 April 1975 Bui Dinh Ha went to reeducation for three days, then was allowed to go home to resume his trade of seller of old books and magazines at stall number 60, Dang Thi Nhu Street, First Precinct.

On 17 April 1981, thanks to the help of a youngster, the cultural organs and the Public Security people of the First Precinct caught him redhanded in the act of loaning out corrupt books. The Administrative Committee of the First Precinct has ordered an administrative inventory of his bookselling stall of which he was the owner. Through this inventory it has been found that he owned 232 books and posters of every kind which exhibited reactionary, corrupt and bad moral contents and which are forbidden material. These materials were subsequently confiscated.

These cultural products include: 30 books written by reactionary lackey authors, 13 monthlies and semimonthlies published by the Catholic Chaplaincy Directorate of the old puppet government, entitled "Tinh Than" ("The Spirit"); 12 semimonthly issues of of the U.S.-puppet psychological warfare organ called "Thoi Nay" ("Our Times"); 38 corrupt and evil novels among which 11 contain highly pornographic material; 17 posters of nude women; and 17 nonsensical comic books for youngsters.

These reactionary products all contain counterrevolutionary content, antisocialist material, material disparaging of the two godlike resistances of our people under the leadership of the Party, and material disparaging and sacrilegious to the extremely revered and beloved leader of our entire people and of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

Such materials as "Political Questions" ("Cac Van De Chinh Tri"), "Tinh Than" and "Thoi Nay" are meant to poison and stimulate the fight-to-the-death spirit of humble sheep in the puppet army, to urge them to do their best to sabotage the revolution and to struggle against the people. They constitute the kind of reactionary political tracts that are opposed to socialism and that have long since been on the index as far as storing and circulating them is concerned.

Among these books there are five which contain articles by the reactionary Tran Quang Thai under the common titles of "What Is To Be Done?" ("Chung Ta Phai Lam Gi?") or "Looking at Our Homeland" ("Nhin Vao Que Huong Chung Ta"). These give a distorted presentation of the truth of revolutionary government, slander and oppose the leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party on every count, they especially sap the faith of the masses in the Party and the revolutionary authorities. The article by Dang Thanh Nhan entitled "The Issue" ("Van De") means to distort and oppose the socialist system in the world. In the magazine "Tinh Than" there is an article by Vu Tien Phuc dealing with the struggle for peace but the content of which is actually anticommunist.

Through the circulation of such materials, Bui Dinh Ha is spreading the ideas of opposition to the present regime, ideas which are clearly reactionary and aimed at promoting the violent overthrow of the regime.

Furthermore, Bui Dinh Ha also kept in store, loaned out and sold 20 "Selected Works of Mao Zedong" published between 1954 and 1960.

As everybody knows, after their military defeat the Peking expansionists are plotting together with the reactionary imperialists, especially the U.S. imperialists, to blockade and isolate us on the diplomatic front and to carry out sabotage inside our country in a comprehensive manner including such aspects as economics, political, diplomatic and cultural-ideological affairs, so as to weaken us and make it possible for them to carry out their aggressive schemes and take over our country. The scheme of the Maoists is to transform China into the center of the world in order to rule the world.

It is clear that Bui Dinh Ha, through his concrete actions, is striving to indirectly serve the plots of not only the imperialists but also of the Chinese expansionist hegemonists.

Before the organs of the law Bui Dinh Ha has admitted that the above-mentioned materials, whether sold or loaned by him, are all thoroughly reactionary, anti-

government, propagandizing for the old regime which has been toppled, and serving the plots of the imperialists and of the Peking expansionist hegemonists.

Among the 11 books with extremely corrupt content and of highly prurient interest there are some which he wrote himself such as "Memoirs of a Libertine" ("Hoi Ky Khoai Lac") or "Diary of My Life" ("Nhat Ky Doi Toi"). In actuality these are nothing more than running stories written in the manner of pornographic films, in which are peppered the most dissolute passages picked up from the foreign novels translated during the U.S.-puppet period or coming from his own dirty experiences. Besides these there were also novels such as "The Life of a Fifteen-Year Old Virgin" ("Cuoc Doi Nang Trinh Nu 15 Tuoi"), "The Rebellion of the Skins of Two Colors" ("Cuoc Noi Loan Giua Hai Mau Da"), etc. which advocate quick love and life grabbing. All these are meant to stimulate the animal in one, to push our youth towards the road of dissolution and rakishness.

He admitted that each time he loaned out this kind of novel, he always included a few nude pictures to increase the readers' sexual interest. Asked whether he realized that these novels have a bad content, he answered: "I think these books are evil because they cause people to lead sexually dissolute lives." Thus, Bui Dinh Ha has deliberately poisoned our people's mind, especially the mind of our youth.

He has admitted that on the average he has circulated between 10 and 15 of these reactionary and corrupt books and magazines, representing a total of a little less than 20,000 times during the last 6 years!

The serious and concretely damaging consequences of Bui Dinh Ha's actions have been to lend a hand to the enemy so that he can try to restore the old reactionary and corrupt culture so as to create disturbances and disrupt public order, to poison our youth and to oppose the building of a new culture by our state and our people.

Under the guise of selling and loaning out continuously these reactionary, corrupt and bad moral products, Bui Dinh Ha has propagandized the slave culture of the enemy and implicitly opposed the national culture with its roots in 4,000 years of history.

Bui Dinh Ha has confirmed in court that he has been reminded constantly about his activities by the market management committee and by the precinct's Culture and Information Service, that he has been warned and admonished twice and that 50 of his books which were on the index list had been confiscated. But he still deliberately followed in the old tracks until 17 April 1981. It is clear that he acted in full consciousness of what he was doing.

Bui Dinh Ha's crime therefore is all too clear.

He must bear the full responsibility for that crime before the law and before the people.

Life Sentence Given

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 26 Jun 81 pp 1, 4

[Article by P.V.: "Guilty of Circulating and Producing Reactionary and Corrupt Cultural Materials Bui Dinh Ha Was Sentenced to Life"]

[Text] After nearly four hours of trial, on the morning of 25 June 1981 the People's Court of Ho Chi Minh City has pronounced Bui Dinh Ha guilty of storing, circulating and producing reactionary and corrupt cultural materials and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

At the trial Bui Dinh Ha has admitted his crime. He fully realized that his actions were illegal since he had been warned, reminded, and admonished on several occasions by various organs and functionaries, but he still went on and obdurately circulated these forbidden materials. Ha further admitted that he knew as a matter of fact that these materials had a reactionary and antigovernment content, that they pushed our youth towards dissolution, idleness, and avoidance of duties towards the state, but he nonetheless went on trading in those materials.

Even more serious is the fact that he himself produced either typewritten or handwritten books which he lent out that are meant to poison the mind of our youth, leading them into the life of dissolution and sexual promiscuity.

Of the 232 bad books confiscated at his stall there were 112 bearing a reactionary political content, with some of an extremely reactionary nature such as "The Soapberry of Eternal Life" ("Trai Dang Truong Sinh") or "The Fruit of Misery" ("Trai Cay Dau Kho") of the lackey author Doan Quoc Sy which were meant to totally distort the truth about the revolution and slander the extremely beloved and revered Uncle Ho of our nation.

Originally a paratrooper guilty towards the people who has been leniently dealt with by the revolutionary authorities, Bui Dinh Ha in his conscious effort to oppose the regime and with his habits of sexual gratification and dissolution, instead of finding gainful e ployment, deliberately sought to sabotage our regime, to lend a hand to the enemy in the hope of paralyzing the will of our youth and debilitating the revolutionary forces.

At the trial many witnesses have angrily condemned the crimes of those given to cultural and ideological poisoning such as Bui Dinh Ha, who lead their children into crime, dissolution and sexual promiscuity, going so far as to turn upside down public morality.

After listening to Mr Le Van Xoan, representative of the city's People's Organ of Control, who analyzed the extremely serious nature of the trial as the defendant has been proved to be guilty of the crimes spelled out in articles 4, 7, and 8 of the decree-law 267/SL promulgated on 15 June 1956 by the Council of Minister, and who proposed that an appropriate sentence be given; and after listening to the discussion of the defendant's crimes by Chief Justice Nguyen Thanh Vinh of the city's People's Court, who based himself on the fact that Bui Dinh Ha has consciously stored and circulated reactionary and corrupt books and magazines and thus has sabotaged and impeded the impleme tation of the cultural policy of the state, lending a hand to the enemy, the court has decided to sentence Bui Dinh Ha to life

BIOGRAPHICS: GOVERNMENT OF HO CHI MINH CITY

[Complete lists of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee elected on 5 June 1981 and of the justices and judges of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Court, as published in Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 5 Jun 81 pp 1 and 4. Names are given in order of appearance in the source.]

I. People's Committee

A. The Standing Body

Mai Chí Thọ [MAI CHIS THOJ]

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; Deputy Secretary of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Chairman of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; election to positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Phan Văn Khải [PHAN VAWN KHAIR]

Standing Member of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Chairman of the Planning Commission, Ho Chi Minh City; election to positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Lê-Đình Nhơn [LEE DINHF NHOWN]

Member of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Standing Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Lê Quang Chánh [LEE QUANG CHANHS]

Member of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Head of the Foreign Relations Department, VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Võ Thành Công [VOX THANHF COONG]

Member of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Vice Chairman of the People's Committee in charge of Industry, Ho Chi Minh City; election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Trần Văn Danh [TRAANF VAWN ZANH]

Member of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Vice Chairman of the People's Committee in charge of agriculture; election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Nguyễn Võ Danh [NGUYEENX VOX ZANH]

Member of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Vice Chairman of the People's Committee in charge of finance and trade; election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Đỗ Duy Liên [DOOX ZUY LIEEN]

Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City in charge of culture and social services; election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Nguyễn Văn Tùng [NGUYEENX VAWN TUNGF]

Secretary Member of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

B. Members and concurrently Sector Directors

Lê Thanh Vân [LEE THANH VAAN]

Standing Member of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Member of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Director of the Public Security Service, Ho Chi Minh City; election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Trần Hải Phụng [TRAANF HAIR PHUNGJ], Major General

Standing Member of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Member of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Military Commander of Ho Chi Minh City; election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Nguyễn Văn Thuyên [NGUYEENX VAWN THUYEENF]

Member of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Member of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Chairman of the Inspection Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Nguyễn Văn Phi [NGUYEENX VAWN PHI]

Vice Minister of Foreign Trade; Member of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Director of the Foreign Trade Service, Ho Chi Minh City; election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Dương Đình Thảo [ZUWOWNG DINHF THAOR]

Member of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Member of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Director of the Culture and Information Service, Ho Chi Minh City; election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Lê Thành Phụng [LEE THANHF PHUNGJ]

Member of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Member of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Director of the Industry Service, Ho Chi Minh City; election of these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Lê Khắc Bình [LEE KHAWCS BINHF]

Member of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Member of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Director of the Commerce Service, Ho Chi Minh City; election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Dương Quang Trung [ZUWOWNG QUANG TRUNG], Doctor of Medicine

Member of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Director of the Public Health Service, Ho Chi Minh City; election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Trương Kỳ Đức [TRUWOWNG KYF DUWCS]

Member of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Director of the Communications and Transportation Service, Ho Chi Minh City; election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Nguyễn Văn Tuấn [NGUYEENX VAWN TUAANS]

Member of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Director of the Real Estate and Public Works Projects Service, Ho Chi Minh City; election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Trương Thị Hồng [TRUWOWNG THIJ HOONGF]

Member of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Member of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Deputy Director of the Education Service, Ho Chi Minh City; election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City Saigon GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

Nguyễn Minh Cẩm [NGUYEENX MINH CAAMR]

Member of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Acting Director of the Finance Service, Ho Chi Minh City; election to these positions on the 2nd People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 pp 1, 4)

II. Roster of Chief Justice, Assistant Chief Justices and Judges of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Court

Nguyễn Thành Vĩnh [NGUYEENX THANHF VINHX]

Chief Justice of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Court; appointment to this position was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 p 4)

Hoàng Vĩnh Thạnh [HOANGF VINHX THANHJ]

Assistant Chief Justice of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Court; appointment to this position was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 p 4)

Nguyễn Hữu Hiền [NGUYEENX HUWUX HIEENF]

Assistant Chief Justice of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Court; appointment to this position was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 p 4)

Trương Thị Huệ [TRUWOWNG THIJ HUEEJ]

Assistant Chief Justice of the Ho Chi MInh City People's Court; appointment to this position was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 p 4)

Ngô Hồng Phát [NGOO HOONGF PHATS]

Justice of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Court; appointment to this position was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 p 4)

Hoàng Trung Tiếu [HOANGF TRUNG TIEEUS]

Justice of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Court' appointment to this position was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 p 4)

Huỳnh Thị Khanh [HUYNHF THIJ KHANH]

Justice of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Court; appointment to this position was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 p 4)

Trần Tuấn Sỹ [TRAANF TUAANS SYX]

Justice of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Court; appointment to this position was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 p 4)

Ngô Thị Hồng Ân [NGOO THIJ HOONGF AAN]

Justice of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Court; appointment to this position was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 p 4)

Phạm Trường Đức [PHAMJ TRUWOWNGF ZUCJ]

Justice of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Court; appointment to this position was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 p 4)

Phan Công Trinh [PHAN COONG TRINH]

Justice of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Court; appointment to this position was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Jun 81 p 4)

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BIOGRAPHIC

MEMBERS OF HANOI 7TH PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE

/The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity/

/Text/ Members of the Hanoi 7th People's Committee elected on 11 Jun 81 (names appear in the order given in the source).

Trần Vĩ /TRAANF VIX/
Chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Nghiêm Chương Châu /NGHIEEM CHUWOWNGR CHAAU/
Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Văn Đình /NGUYEENX VAWN DINHF/ aka Minh Đạt /MINH DATJ/
Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Đông /NGUYEENX DOONG/
Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Đình Hiệp /NGUYEENX DINHF HIEEPJ/
Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Phạm Sĩ Liêm /PHAMJ SIX LIEEM/
Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Đặng Đức Lộc /DAWNGJ DUWCS LOOCJ/
Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Trần Tấn /TRAANF TAANS/
Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Bùi Xuân Lộc /BUIF XUAAN LOOCJ/
Secretary Member of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Xuân Bảo /NGUYEENX XUAAN BAOR/
Member of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Bá Cẩn /NGUYEENX BAS CAANR/
Member of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Côn /NGUYEENX COON/
Member of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Dung /NGUYEENX ZUNG/
Member of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Lỗ Giang /LUW GIANG/
Member of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Mạnh Khuê /NGUYEENX MANHJ KHUEE/
Member of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Phạm Tâm Long /PHAMJ TAAM LONG/
Member of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Đinh Văn Lỗ /DINH VAWN LUWX/
Member of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Phùng Minh /PHUNGF MINH/
Member of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Đặng Thị Minh Thuần /DAWNGJ THIJ MINH THUAANR/
Member of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Trần Tiến /TRAANF TIEENS/
Member of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Trương Tùng /TRUWOWNG TUNGF/
Member of the People's Committee, Hanoi; election to this position was announced in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 11 Jun 81 p 1)

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(Article by Le Ngoc, head of the Party History Faculty of the Nguyen Ai Quoc Advanced Party School)

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(Article by Dang Kim Thanh, the Party History Faculty of the Nguyen Ai Quoc Advanced Party School)

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Thoughts on the Socio-Economic Structure (pp 23-26)
(Article by Luu Thi Duc Nhung, the Propaganda and Training Department of the Party Central Committee)

The Lenin Workstyle (pp 27-32)
(Article by Pham Ho)

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(Article by Le Tat Thang [LEE TAATS THANNGS])

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(Article by Major General Hoang Dien [HOANGF DIEENF]) [being translated]

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(Article by Lieutenant Colonel Phan Minh Thao [PHAN MINH THAOR])

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